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Abstract:  
This paper studies the dynamics of fundamental research. We develop a simple 
model where researchers allocate their effort between improving existing fields and 
inventing new ones. A key assumption is that scientists derive utility from recognition 
from other scientists. We show that the economy can be either in a regime where 
new fields are constantly invented, and then converges to a steady state, or in a 
cyclical regime where periods of innovation alternate with periods of exploitation. We 
characterize the cyclical dynamics of the economy, show that indeterminacy may 
appear, and establish some comparative statics and welfare implications. 
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“my love of natural science (...) has been much aided by the am-
bition to be esteemed by my fellow naturalists.” Darwin (1958).
1 Introduction
This paper studies the dynamics of fundamental research. We observe that
periods of intense innovations are followed by periods of exploitation of ex-
isting fields. We want to understand these dynamics and be able to study
whether they are eﬃcient from the point of view of social welfare.
A key aspect we are interested in is the credential one. Scientists derive
utility from recognition from other scientists, which often takes the form of
citations. In our model, the value derived by a scientist from a paper he has
written is the sum of an “intrinsic” value of the paper, which depends on
the field in which it is written and its order of appearance in that field, and
a “citation premium” which depends on the number of subsequent papers
written in that field.
We show that our model yields a rich set of results, both with respect to
the cyclical dynamics of the allocation of the research eﬀort and in terms of
the comparative statics around the steady state, when it exists.
More specifically, we show that the economy can be either in a regime
where new fields are constantly invented, and then converges to a steady
state, or in a cyclical regime where periods of innovation alternate with peri-
ods where one only exploits existing fields. Furthermore, these cycles are very
irregular and the duration of a cycle is “unpredictable” from the duration of
the previous cycle — i.e. related to it by a very nonlinear function.
Furthermoire, we are able to perform comparative statics in the conver-
gence regime and show that a (i) higher citation premium raises the equi-
librium rate of innovation, (ii) a mean-preserving spread in the distribution
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of the value of new fields reduces the equilibrium rate of innovation and
(iii) a larger citation premium makes researchers less risk-averse, in that it
alleviates (and potentially reverses) that eﬀect.
We introduce the distinction between extensive and intensive research to
the study of scientific progress. Studies of technological changes have long
stressed the diﬀerence between improvements of known processes and inno-
vations leading to new products (e.g. Rosenberg (1972)). Similarly, it seems
that some scientific contributions are pioneering and open up new avenues
for future research, while others mainly refine or extend previous work. This
distinction lies at the core of Kuhn (1970)’s influential theory of scientific
evolution. In his view, science alternates between periods of normal sci-
ence and scientific revolutions. Under normal science, progress is gradual
and builds up on past achievements. In contrast, scientific revolutions cor-
respond to paradigm shifts during which scientists qualitatively change their
focus and assumptions. Without necessarily adhering to Kuhn’s view, other
observers have noted the importance of fads and fashions in science. Bron-
fenbrenner (1966) gives an early account of fads in economics. Stephan and
Levin (1991) discuss how scientific fashions might aﬀect a scientist’s career.
Sunstein (2001) relates academic fads to informational cascades.
This literature remains relatively undeveloped.2 We develop the first
formal model of the evolution of science that gives rise to innovation cycles
and scientific fashions. We also explicitly account for the unique reward
structure of science, by assuming that scientists care for recognition by their
peers through citations of their work.3
In the literature on growth,4 several papers look at innovation cycles.
2Exceptions include Levin and Stephan (1991), Brock and Durlauf (1999), Goyal et al.
(2006), see also Stephan (1996) and the references therein.
3Scientists could also care for citations because of the financial gains they generate, see
e.g. Diamond (1986).
4Our paper is also related to the literature on directed innovation in growth models,
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Jovanovic and Rob (1990) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) build learning
models. In Jovanovic and Rob (1990), an agent can explore a known or an
unknown dimension of the technological space. Innovation cycles emerge for
an intermediate range of the parameters. In Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996),
the agent chooses between a known and a better, but unknown, technology.
Permanent upgrading and growth can coexist with technological lock-in and
stagnation. Matsuyama (1999) shows how innovation cycles can emerge in
an endogenous growth model. Phases where investment is concentrated on
old technologies alternate with phases with innovation. Innovation cycles
emerge because of the temporary monopoly power enjoyed by innovators.
In contrast, the mechanism that drives our cycles is due to a multiplier
eﬀect, namely the fact that one unit of eﬀort devoted to creating a new field
today induces more than one unit of eﬀort to exploit this field tomorrow.
Another novelty of our specification, relative to these papers, is the cita-
tion premium.5 Through citations, payoﬀs from a scientist’s current choice
depend on the future evolution of science. This introduces a non-trivial
dynamic linkage between current and future actions. We show that the ex-
istence of innovation cycles does not depend on that of a citation premium,
but that it aﬀects their characteristics. In particular, a higher improvement
phase tends to reduce the length of the improvement phase relative to the
invention phase.
Note that our results could also potentially be applied to the analysis
of commercial R & D, with our citation premium being reinterpreted as
which studies the incentive to innovate in one sector vs. another (See Acemoglu, 1998).
The determinants of innovation in existing vs. new fields which we discuss here, however,
are substantially diﬀerent from the ones studied in that literature. The two approaches
could be brought together, however, by assuming that exploiting existing fields uses dif-
ferent factors of production than invention.
5Another diﬀerence is that the agent can make one search per period in Jovanovic
and Rob (1990) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), while in our model research eﬀort is
continuous and allocated among diﬀerent alternatives in every period.
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the income derived by an innovator from the royalties paid by subsequent
innovators building on his or her invention. The level of the citation premium
can then be interpreted as the level of intellectual property6.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in
section 2. We present our main result in section 3 and interpret it in section
4. We derive comparative statics in section 5 and comparative dynamics in
section 6. We show that indeterminacy may appear in section 7, and establish
some welfare results in section 8.
2 The model
We consider an infinite horizon model with discrete time. At each date t
there is a continuum of existing fields of research, which we index by i. Each
field is characterized by a stock of contributions (or ‘papers’) nt(i) at the end
of period t.
Papers are produced by researchers. Researchers live for two periods,
hence we have an overlapping generation structure. In the first period of
their life, researchers produce contributions. In the second period of their
life, they enjoy the returns from their scientific “reputation”, which defines
their utility function. A researcher’s scientific reputation is the sum of the
contribution of each individual paper he or she has written. An individual
paper written at date t in existing field i yields the following contribution to
its author’s reputation:
vt(i) = ω(i)− β(lnnt(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i)).
This reputation is the sum of two terms. The first term, ω(i)−β(ln nt(i)−
ln n¯), defines the intrinsic value of the paper. ω(i) is a field-specific constant
6Or, more generally, as the degree of appropriability of the returns to innovation
through their embodiment in physical goods, as in Boldrin and Levine (2005).
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which represents the field’s value (or initial research potential) as a whole.
The term β(ln nt(i)− ln n¯), where β and n¯ are positive parameters, captures
the fact that there are decreasing returns to research: the larger the stock of
knowledge in field i, the smaller the intrinsic value of additional contributions.
The second term, θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i)), is the citation premium. It tells us
that the reputation obtained from papers written at t is greater, the greater
the flow of further advances in the relevant field at t + 1. Underlying this
formulation is the idea that papers come in a given order, and that new
papers cite previous papers, thus enhancing their author’s reputation. Note
that contemporaneous papers do not cite each other, so that what matters
for citations is the log diﬀerence between the stock of papers written at the
end of t+ 1 and that at the end of t.
The total mass of researchers per generation is normalized to 1. Each
researcher is endowed with ν units of time. He allocates his time optimally
between writing papers in diﬀerent fields. In addition to that, one may create
new fields.7
When one writes the first paper in a new field, its potential ω(i) is drawn
from some distribution, with pdf f(.), such that all moments exist. The
realization of ω(i) is unknown when one decides to write the paper. At the
end of the period when the new field is created, its advancement level is set
at the minimal value n¯. Therefore, one must wait one period before making
further contributions to a new field.
We assume that one unit of time produces either 1 paper in an existing
field or γ papers in a new field.
We make two technical assumptions that we need to be able to solve the
model:
7Note that this distinction between fundamental and secondary innovation is diﬀerent
from the one used by Aghion and Howitt (1996, 2000 ch. 6), who assume that secondary
innovation results from learning by doing only.
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Assumption A1 — If at date t, there is a strictly positive measure of new
fields invented, then all fields invented before date t can no longer be re-
searched from date t+ 1 on.
This assumption is a useful simplification that avoids having to keep track
of all the fields ever invented at any date t.8 Only the fields invented in the
last wave of innovation can be exploited at a given date.9
Assumption A2 — γ < 1.
This assumption states that inventing a new field requires more labor than
writing a paper in an existingf field. It is a plausible, but merely technical
assumption, required to prove the existence of an equilibrium for θ > 0.10
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we show the existence of an equilibrium, and the conditions
under which it is cyclical as opposed to converging to a steady state. We
provide a result for uniqueness in the case where θ = 0. We first discuss the
equilibrium conditions of the model in the two regimes of interest. We then
state the paper’s main result, whose proof is relegated to the Appendix. In
the next section, we discuss its economic interpretation using a graphical il-
lustration, confining ourselves to the θ = 0 case. We then work out numerical
8This assumption is consistent with Kuhn’s theory: “When it repudiates a paradigm,
a scientific community simultaneously renounces most of the books and articles in which
that paradigm had been embodied”, Kuhn (1970). See also theorem 2 in Jovanonvic and
Rob (1990) and the “no-recall” assumption of Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996).
9It is not necessary to make this assumption in the special case where θ = 0. In such
a case the value of inventing a new field is VN = γω¯ = γE(ω), which is also the lower
bound of the value of working on an existing field, since one could always produce new
fields instead. Consequently, when new fields are invented, all previous fields reach their
maximum advancement level, such that the value of the marginal paper is equal to VN ;
they will not be exploited thereafter.
10It is again not needed for θ = 0.
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examples. Finally, we give a sketch of the proof when the citation premium
is positive.
3.1 Equilibrium conditions
At any point in time, the economy may be in one of two regimes:
In Regime I, all the research input is allocated to improving existing fields.
There exists a shadow value of time λt; a field is exploited if and only if the
first paper written in the current period has a value greater than λt, that is:
ω(i)− β(lnnt−1(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt−1(i)) > λt.
The number of papers written in such a field, at t, must satisfy
ω(i)− β(lnnt(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i)) = λt.
The equilibrium value of λt must adjust so that the total mass of papers
being written is equal to υ. Call s the last period where invention took place,
and µs the mass of new fields invented at s. The evolution of one of these
fields will clearly be a sole function of its intrinsic value ω. Thus nt can be
written as a sole function of ω rather than the field’s specific index i. The
preceding conditions are equivalent to
ω > (β + θ) lnnt−1(ω)− β ln n¯− θ lnnt+1(ω) + λt, (1)
and
nt(ω) = n¯
β
β+θnt+1(ω)
θ
β+θ e
ω−λt
β+θ . (2)
The full employment condition can therefore be written as
µs
Z
ω>(β+θ) lnnt−1(ω)−β ln n¯−θ lnnt+1(ω)+λt
(nt(ω)− nt−1(ω))f(ω)dω = υ. (3)
Finally, the value of writing a new paper, denoted by Vt, must be lower
than that of working on an existing field:
Vt < λt.
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In Regime II, people exploit existing fields, and work on new fields as
well. They must be indiﬀerent between the two activities, so that one must
have λt = Vt. An existing field is exploited if and only if
ω > (β + θ) lnnt−1(ω)− β ln n¯− θ lnnt+1(ω) + Vt. (4)
Its advancement level then proceeds to
nt(ω) = n¯
β
β+θnt+1(ω)
θ
β+θ e
ω−Vt
β+θ .
Because of Assumption (A1), the existing fields will disappear at t+1 and
be replaced by the mass µt of new fields, which will start with advancement
level n¯ at t + 1.Therefore, nt+1(ω) = nt(ω), since existing fields at t are no
longer exploited at t+ 1. Substituting, the final advancement level is:
nt(ω) = n¯e
ω−Vt
β , (5)
while (4) can be rewritten
ω > Vt + β(lnnt−1(ω)− ln n¯).
Note that this condition collapses to
ω > Vt (6)
if the economy was also in regime II at date t− 1, since the field must then
have been invented at that date.
In regime II, the resource constraint states that total time devoted to
existing fields cannot exceed υ :
µs
Z
ω>β(lnnt−1(ω)−ln n¯)+Vt
(nt(ω)− nt−1(ω))f(ω)dω ≤ υ.
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The remaining time endowment must be devoted to new fields; this de-
termines the mass of new fields invented at t :
µt = γ
∙
υ − µs
Z
ω>β(lnnt−1(ω)−ln n¯)+Vt
(nt(ω)− nt−1(ω))f(ω)dω
¸
.
Finally, in both regimes, the value of working in a new field Vt is deter-
mined as follows. Consider a researcher writing a paper in a new field with
value ω. Then, nt(ω) = n¯. If (1) holds at t+ 1, which is equivalent to
ω > θ ln n¯− θ lnnt+2(ω) + λt+1,
then the field will be active, and the inventor will benefit from citations. The
value to the inventor is then given by
Vt(ω) = ω + θ(lnnt+1(ω)− n¯)
where nt+1(ω) = n¯
β
β+θnt+2(ω)
θ
β+θ e
ω−λt+1
β+θ .
Otherwise, the field will not be active at t+1, and the inventor just gets
the intrinsic value of the first paper:
Vt(ω) = ω.
Thus, the value of working on a new field at t is given by:
Vt = γ
∙
ω¯ +
θ
β + θ
Z
ω>λt+1−θ(lnnt+2(ω)−ln n¯)
(ω − λt+1 + θ(lnnt+2(ω)− ln n¯)) f(ω)dω
¸
.
3.2 Existence, uniqueness, and cycles
We now state the central results of the paper. To do so, we need to introduce
the following two functions:
Φ(y) = γ
∙
ω¯ +
θ
β
Z +∞
y
(ω − y) f(ω)dω
¸
, (7)
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and
I∗(y) =
Z +∞
y
(e
ω−y
β − 1)f(ω)dω.
Most of the equilibrium conditions involving the value of a new field V
can be stated in terms of the Φ function; for example, it can be easily shown
that if the economy is in regime II in two consecutive periods t and t + 1,
then Vt = Φ(Vt+1). As for I∗, it shows up whenever one is adding progresses
across exploited fields to get the associated total labor input. For example, if
θ = 0 and fields are exploited for the first time, then the LHS of (3) is equal
to µsn¯I
∗(λt).
Both functions are continuous and decreasing. Since Φ(0) ≥ γω¯ and
Φ(+∞) = γω¯, Φ has a fixed point V¯ :
Φ(V¯ ) = V¯ . (8)
The paper’s main result can be stated as follows:
PROPOSITION 1 — Assume that the economy starts at t = 0 with an
initial mass of fields µ−1, whose intrinsic value is distributed with f(), and
whose initial advancement level is given by n¯. Then:
(i) There exists an equilibrium path.
(ii) If
I∗(V¯ ) >
1
γn¯
, (9)
then any equilibrium is cyclical, i.e. periods in regime I alternate with periods
in regime II. During periods in regime II, the mass of invented fields follows
explosive oscillations, until the economy reverts to regime I. During periods
in regime I, the set of exploited fields grows. The duration of a period in
regime I cannot exceed γn¯I∗(γω¯).
(iii) If
I∗(V¯ ) <
1
γn¯
,
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then there exists an equilibrium such that
-the economy is in regime II from t = 0 on.
-the value of working in a new field is equal to V¯ at all dates.
-the mass of invented fields converges to its steady state value, given by
µ¯ =
γν
1 + γn¯I∗(V¯ )
,
by dampened oscillations.
(iv) If θ = 0, equilibrium is unique.11
PROOF — See Appendix.
4 Interpretation
4.1 Without citation premium
To analyze the reason behind cycles, let us focus on the simpler case where
θ = 0. In the absence of a citation premium, inventors of new fields just get
the intrinsic value of the field, ω, as a reward. Consequently, the value of a
new field is pinned down and equal to V = γω¯ in any period.
Figure 1 plots the value of working in an existing field at any date t, λt, as
a function of the total input in existing fields; that defines the LL schedule.
This curve is downward-sloping, because of decreasing returns, captured by
the −β(lnnt(i) − ln n¯) term in the utility function. For the same reason,
its position is lower, the higher the initial advancement level of those fields,
nt−1(i). Finally, given that level, its position is higher, the greater the mass
of available fields µs, since the same total research input is now associated
with a lower advancement level nt(i) in each field.
If, as is the case in Figure 1, that schedule intersects the horizontal line
VV at λ = V, then the economy is in regime II. The horizontal distance AB
11We conjecture that the equilibrium is unique for θ small enough, but cannot prove it.
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determines the labor input into new fields, and hence the mass of fields being
invented.
If that is not the case, then the economy must be in regime I, and equilib-
rium determination is illustrated in Figure 2. At date t, all researchers work
in existing fields. Advancement in these fields generate a downward shift in
LL, and the intercept of the LL schedule for the next period must be equal
to λt — which simply means that the value of the first marginal paper at t+1
in a given field is equal to the value of the last paper written in that field
at t. The process continues until the LL schedule cuts the VV schedule, in
which case one is back to regime II (at t + 2 in the case of Figure 2). This
must happen in finite time, otherwise decreasing returns would eventually
drive VV below the λ = 0 line. Note that the λts fall during the regime I
period. That is the reason why the set of fields being exploited grows during
that phase.12
What happens, next, in regime II? At each date, a given mass of fields
is invented. The greater that mass, the greater the value of exploiting these
fields next period (i.e. LL shifts up). On average, one field invented at date
t, with a quality distribution f(ω), triggers an amount n¯I∗(V ) of research
input devoted to exploiting that field at date t+1. That reduces the amount
of time devoted to innovation: the greater the mass of fields invented today,
the lower the mass of fields invented tomorrow. The evolution of µt, the mass
of fields invented at t, evolves according to
µt = γ(υ − µt−1n¯I∗(V )). (10)
If these dynamics are stable (n¯I∗(V ) < 1, Figure 3), then the economy
converges to a steady state. Otherwise, (n¯I∗(V ) > 1, Figure 4), the economy
12Because of assumption A1, a field exploited during that phase must have been invented
in the last period in regime II before the regime I phase. It enters regime I with an initial
advancement level equal to n¯. Using (1) with θ = 0, it will therefore be exploited as soon
as ω > λt. Because the λs are falling, it will continue to be exploited until the economy
reverts to regime II, when it becomes obsolete.
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cannot remain in regime II forever: it will revert to regime I. As regime I
itself cannot last forever, the two regimes must prevail alternatively.
The instability condition n¯I∗(V ) > 1 simply means that a unit of labor
employed in inventing a new field today attracts more than one unit of labor
into exploiting that field tomorrow. That in turn reduces the amount of labor
inventing new fields tomorrow more than one for one, thus generating the
explosive oscillatory dynamics and the subsequent exit from regime II. The
greater the quantity I∗(V ), the more invented fields are attractive, and the
more likely it is that cycles arise.
4.2 Constructing an equilibrium
Constructing an equilibrium turns out to be easy in the θ = 0 case. Consider
Regime I. At any date, there are two kind of fields: those who are exploited,
and those who have never been exploited since their invention. The latter
are such that ω ≤ λt have an advancement level equal to n¯; the former, such
that ω > λt, reach an advancement level equal to nt(ω) = n¯e
ω−λt
β . At t+1, all
these fields are exploited, plus a mass of extra fields such that λt > ω > λt+1.
The research input into existing fields at date t+ 1 is therefore equal to
υAt+1 = µs
Z
ω>λt+1
(nt+1(ω)− nt(ω))f(ω)dω
= µs
Z
λt>ω>λt+1
(n¯e
ω−λt
β − n¯)f(ω)dω + µs
Z
ω>λt
(n¯e
ω−λt+1
β − n¯e
ω−λt
β )f(ω)dω
= n¯µs(I
∗(λt+1)− I∗(λt)).
In the first period of regime I, t = s+ 1, no field has been exploited and
the equation boils down to
υAs+1 = n¯µsI
∗(λs+1).
Regime I proceeds as long as υAt = υ. In the first regime II period, T,
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after regime I, one must have λT = V = γω¯, and 0 ≤ υAT < υ. Therefore, it
must be that
(i) λt = I∗−1((t− s) νn¯µs ).
(ii) The duration of the regime I phase is entirely pinned down by the
condition I∗−1((T − s) νn¯µs ) ≤ V < I
∗−1((T − 1− s) νn¯µs ), i.e.
T − s− 1 = INT (I∗(V ) n¯µs
ν
). (11)
Note that one may have T = s+1, in which case there is no regime I phase.
This happens if and only if
I∗−1(
ν
n¯µs
) ≤ V. (12)
(iii) The economy enters regime II with an initial measure of new fields
given by
µT = γ(υ − υAt)
= γ(υ − n¯µs(I∗(V )− I∗(λT−1)))
= γυ(1−DEC(I∗(V ) n¯µs
υ
)). (13)
Therefore, given an initial measure of invented fields at s, we can construct
a unique, possibly empty, phase in regime I, and compute its length and the
initial measure of invented fields in the first period T of the subsequent regime
II phase.
The regime II phase is then constructed by mechanically applying (10).
The economy asymptotically converges to the steady state if n¯I∗(V ) < 1;
otherwise, it remains in regime II until date s0 such that
µs0n¯I
∗(V ) > υ (14)
This gives the measure of invented fields available for the next regime I phase.
One can then iterate the procedure. Note that s0 is determined uniquely: on
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the one hand, the economy cannot remain in regime II after the first date
which satisfies (14), as µs0+1 would then be negative. On the other hand, if
one picks up a date prior to s0 for the transition to regime I, it would satisfy
(12), thus leading to an empty regime I phase, which would not change the
equilibrium.
It should be noted that equation (13), which related the mass of invented
fields after a phase in regime I to the mass of invented fields before that phase,
is discontinuous and highly non linear. Thus we expect cycles to be irregular:
the characteristics of a cycle, such as the time spent in each regime and the
mass of invented fields, are almost “unpredictable” from the characteristics
of the preceding cycle.13
4.3 Numerical illustration
In this section we provide some simulations in order to get a better idea of
the irregular nature of the innovation cycles. We assume that the quality of a
field ω is drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, ωu], implying ω¯ = ωu/2.
13A similar nonlinearity applies to the mass of invented fields at the end of phase II, and
the duration of phase II, as a function of the initial mass of invented fields µT . Solving for
(10) yields
µt+1 =
γν
1 + γn¯I∗
+
µ
µT −
γν
1 + γn¯I∗
¶
(−γn¯I∗)(t−T ) .
One has to distinguish between two cases.
If µT >
γν
1+γn¯I∗ , then s
0 − T must be even, and one must have
s0 = T + 2INT
Ã
ln γνµT(µc)+1(1+γnI
∗)−γν
2 ln(γn¯I∗)
+
1
2
!
.
If µT <
γν
1+γn¯I∗ , then
s0 = 2INT
Ã
ln γνµT (µc)+1(1+γnI
∗)−γν
2 ln(γn¯I∗)
!
+ 1.
As the initial measure µT changes, the duration of phase II will jump, and so will µs0 .
Therefore, we also have discontinuities in the function which related µs0 to µT .
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Figures 5 to 10 report the simulation results for the following set of pa-
rameters: n¯ = 2; ωu = 1;β = 0.3; γ = 0.7; ν = 1. The initial measure of
existing fields was taken as µc = 1.
It is easy to show that (9) holds in this case, so that the equilibrium
must be cyclical. The simulation shows that the economy follows cycles that
are irregular, both in the duration spent in regime I and the duration spent
in regime II. The time spent in regime I oscillates between 1 and 2 periods
(Fig. 5), while time spent in regime II oscillates between 1 and up to 6
periods (Fig. 8)14. There are also chaotic oscillations in the stock of new
fields available for exploration at the beginning of each regime I phase (Figure
6). Furthermore, as (11) predicts, there is a tight connection between that
initial stock and the length of the time spent in period 1 (Fig. 7); the regime
I cycle lasts for 2 periods if the initial stock of knowledge is >≈ 0.6, and for
1 period otherwise.
Figure 9 reports the average rate of innovation during the time spent in
regime II. We see that it exhibits irregular fluctuations. We also see (Figure
10), that cycles where a longer time is spent in regime II, have a lower rate of
innovation. Intuitively, if a large number of researchers produce new fields,
it is more likely that the economy reverts to regime I in the following period
in order to exploit the potential of these new fields15.
Relative to that benchmark simulation, we can perform some exercices.
Figures 11 and 12 report the structure of cycles when we reduce the decreas-
ing returns parameter from β = 0.3 to β = 0.2.16 We see that overall, the
14These figures report the 70 first cycles after the initial one.
15Another interesting property of that simulation, is that cycles where regime I lasts for
two periods, are such that the economy only spends 1 period in regime II. The explanation
could be as follows: at the end of such cycles, fields are quite exhausted, and the value of
working in new fields in regime II is quite high. Thus a large mass of innovation will take
place during a short period of time, after which people revert to exploiting the new fields.
However, this explanation is incomplete, since longer cycles are also those with a higher
total initial potential. And that regularity is not robust to parameter changes.
16Given the richer results, simulation are reported over 140 cycles rather than 70.
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economy spends more time in regime I and less time in regime II. In a cycle,
regime I last between 1 and 5 periods, although that is quite often just 1
period, and regime II typically does not exceed 2 periods, although there are
very rare occurences of cycles where the economy spends 3 periods in regime
II.
In fact, while there is a maximum duration for the regime I phase, if
the dynamics are truly chaotic one will have (very rare) regime II phases of
arbitrary length. The reason is that the initial values of µ will span all the
[0, γυ] interval, becoming sometimes arbitrarily close to the unstable steady
state value µ¯.
4.4 With citation premium
Two main diﬃculties arise when trying to extend the previous analysis to
the case θ > 0. First, current exploitation of an existing field now depends
on the future evolution of the field. Thus, nt(ω) depends on λt and nt+1(ω)
in eq. (2). And second, the value of writing a paper in a new field Vt will
generally vary with t.
In the Appendix, we show that the first issue can be addressed by back-
ward induction from the last period of exploitation. Consider fields being
exploited in a regime I episode, lasting from s+ 1 to T − 1. Their exploita-
tion ends at T , the first new period in regime II. At T , there are no more
future citations for these fields, hence nT (ω) only depends on VT . This de-
termines the citation premium at T − 1 and nT−1(ω). Reasoning backward,
we show that the analysis for θ = 0 can be replicated through an appropri-
ate change of variable on the shadow value of time λt. In the end, research
dynamics in regime I episodes only depend on two factors: the mass of fields
originally available, µs+1, and the value of invention at the end, VT . Espe-
cially, eqs. (11) and (13) directly extend. Duration of regime I phase is now
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given by
T − s− 1 = INT (I∗(VT )
n¯µs
ν
)
while the mass of new fields invented at T is
µT = γυ(1−DEC(I∗(VT )
n¯µs
υ
))
Next, we describe how the value of writing a paper in a new field, Vt,
evolves. This evolution diﬀers within regimes and at regime transitions.
Within regime I, changes in Vt do not matter, as new fields are never invented.
Within regime II, it is easy to see that Vt = Φ(Vt+1). The final, key equation
is provided by the transition from regime II to regime I. Let s be a last period
in regime II. The citation premium for new fields invented at s depend on
the extent of their exploitation at s+ 1, the first period of the new regime I
phase. In turn, this mainly depends on the mass of new fields invented at s,
µs. More precisely, we show in Appendix that:
Vs = Φ(I∗−1(
ν
µsn¯
))
Finally, we show that an equilibrium indeed exists. The proof is com-
plicated by the fact that the function describing the evolution of µ is not
continuous, nor contracting. We carefully construct sequences avoiding the
discontinuities.
We are now in a position to analyze how the parameters of interest aﬀect
the equilibrium. We do it in two steps: first, we look at the case where
(9) does not hold, and perform local comparative statics around the steady
state. Second, we consider how the structure of cycles is aﬀected by the
model parameters when (9) holds.
5 Comparative statics
In this section, we perform local comparative statics around a regime II
steady state. In particular, we are interested in how the equilibrium level of
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invention, µ¯, is aﬀected by
• The citation premium θ,
• The distribution of field quality f(ω); in particular: how does the risk-
iness of invention, measured by the variance of f(.), aﬀect the equilib-
rium allocation of eﬀort between innovation and exploitation?
• The strength of decreasing returns β.
5.1 The eﬀect of the citation premium
Equation (7) clearly implies that V¯ is an increasing function of θ. Further-
more, one can straightforwardly check that dI∗/dV¯ < 0. Hence, dµ¯/dV¯ > 0.
Consequently,
PROPOSITION 2 — More research input is devoted to new fields, the
higher the citation premium θ.
This result is not totally obvious. In principle, the citation premium
increases incentives to work both in new fields and in existing fields. How-
ever, in this equilibrium, existing fields are only exploited during one period;
thus one earns no citation premium on them. An increase in θ thus clearly
increases the value of working on new fields.
5.2 The role of research uncertainty
Next, we look at the role of uncertainty in research; we want to know how
the variance of ω — or any mean-preserving spread parameter denoted by σ
— aﬀects the arbitrage between working in new fields vs. existing fields. As
we shall see, option values intervene in two conflicting ways.
We first note that I∗(V ) can be written asE(z(ω)),where z(ω) = max(e
ω(i)−V
β −
1, 0) is a convex function of ω(i). By Jensen’s inequality, a mean-preserving
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spread in the distribution of ω raises I∗(V ) for any given V. If V were to
remain unchanged, or move by only a little, µ would actually fall: more
research uncertainty reduces the incentives to work in new fields.
If θ = 0, it is actually true that V¯ does not change in response to a mean-
preserving change in the distribution of ω, for it is equal to γω¯. Similarly,
eq. (7) implies that for θ arbitrarily small the change in V¯ can be made
arbitrarily small. Therefore:
PROPOSITION 3 — For θ small enough a mean-preserving spread in the
distribution of ω reduces µ∞.
∂µ∞
∂σ
< 0.
Uncertainty increases the value of existing fields because one can select
those of them with the highest potential. A greater variance of ω means that
it is more valuable to work in the top field, while the value of working in the
bottom fields is unchanged, because these fields are abandoned anyway. In
contrast, the value of writing the first paper in an unknown field is increased
is the field turns out to be good, but reduced if it turns out to be bad — if
θ is small, then that value will roughly equal ω(i), regardless of the fate of
the field after its invention. Hence greater uncertainty increases the value to
work in known fields relative to unknown, new fields.
Against that logic, runs the fact that uncertainty increases the value of
new fields, because of the citation premium. That is apparent from (7): a
mean-preserving spread in ω increases its RHS. The option value of working
in an existing field only if it is good enough also aﬀects the value of working
in new fields through the citation premium. When uncertainty goes up,
researchers gain from their good ideas being cited more, but do not lose from
their bad, uncited ideas, being cited less. In other words, the higher the
citation premium, the less risk-averse the researchers.
21
PROPOSITION 4 — A mean preserving spread in ω increases V¯ :
∂V¯
∂σ
> 0.
The eﬀect is larger, the larger the citation premium:
∂2V¯
∂σ∂θ
> 0.
Consequently, the larger the citation premium, the lower the negative ef-
fect of uncertainty on the research input into new fields:
∂2µ∞
∂θ∂σ
> 0.
An interesting question is: can the reduction in risk aversion induced
by the citation premium be so strong as to overturn the direct eﬀect of
uncertainty, so that one would have ∂µ∞∂σ > 0?
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5.3 The role of decreasing returns
A similar trade-oﬀ appears regarding the eﬀect of β. It is easy to see that
I∗(V ) is a decreasing function of β. Thus, when θ = 0 or θ is small enough, µ
increases when β increases. Since existing fields lose their value more quickly,
while the rewards from invention are (almost) unchanged, researchers devote
more time to invention. As with uncertainty, an opposite eﬀect comes into
play through the citation premium. Observe that V¯ is decreasing in β when
θ > 0. The citation premium is lower since with a higher β fields are being
less exploited. Consequently, the value of writing a paper in a new field is
lower (they will be cited less), which tends to counteract the first eﬀect.
17We ran simulations, not shown here, with uniform distributions for ω. In these simu-
lations, the overall eﬀect of uncertainty on µ was always negative.
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6 Comparative dynamics
Given the highly nonlinear nature of our cycles, it is diﬃcult to establish com-
parative dynamics results. However, Proposition 5 establishes some results
about the impact of the citation premium on the likelihood and structure
of cycles. Typically, the casual idea that a greater citation premium makes
“fads” more important and therefore cycles more likely, is not supported by
the model. The reason is that the value of new fields goes up with the citation
premium, which reduces the attractivity of existing fields, thus making it less
likely that instability arises in (10). As the next section shows, however, a
larger citation premium makes fads more likely in an indeterminacy sense.
PROPOSITION 5 — (i) The equilibrium is less likely to be cyclical, the
greater θ.
(ii) Conditional on the initial mass of invented fields, the economy spends
less time in the regime I phase for θ > 0 than for θ = 0. Furthermore, if
the amount of time spent in regime I is the same, then more invention takes
place at the beginning of the subsequent regime II phase, if θ > 0.
PROOF — See Appendix.
7 Indeterminacy and “sunspots”
The greater θ, the more expectations about future citations have a strong
eﬀect on the decision to work on a given field. By analogy with the literature
on indeterminacy, we can speculate that there are multiple equilibria for θ
large enough. That is actually the case. The following result shows that there
is local indeterminacy around the regime II steady state for large enough
values of θ.
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PROPOSITION 6 — Assume
γθ
β
(1− F (V¯ )) > 1
and
I∗(V¯ ) <
1
γn¯
.
Then there exists a continuum of equilibria indexed by any initial value
V0 = V¯ + vt, for vt suﬃciently small.
PROOF — See Appendix.
This indeterminacy aﬀects the value of invention. If scientists think that
opening new fields brings a higher payoﬀ, they devote more eﬀort to inven-
tion. The mass of papers in new fields is higher. This increases subsequent
research in the better of these new fields. The citation premium originally
associated to the new fields is thus eﬀectively larger, which confirms the orig-
inal expectation. In short, expecting invention to bring a high payoﬀ can be
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
8 Some welfare results
Due to the complexity of our model, it is not easy to make a thorough
comparison between the equilibrium and the social optimum. However, it is
possible to compare the steady state in regime II to its equivalent for the
social planner. That is what we do in this section.
In order to perform a welfare analysis, a criterion is needed. There are
many options since our model only specifies the value of innovation to re-
searchers. An ample literature discusses the appropriability problems asso-
ciated with research. Here we want to use our model to focus on only one
market failure, which is that the stock of knowledge created by researchers
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is durable and will benefit future generations beyond their lifetime. We then
show that absent a citation premium the value of a new field in the equilib-
rium steady state is lower than at the optimum steady state, and that an
optimal “pigovian” citation premium can be introduced so as to induce the
socially optimal level of fundamental. We provide a formula for computing
this citation premium.
The social welfare function we use is as follows. At each date t there is
a stock of knowledge Kt, which grows because of the introduction of new
fields and because of improvements in existing fields. We assume that the
increase in the stock of knowledge is equal to the intrinsic value of all papers
written at date t. Thus, the intrinsic value perceived by each researcher
captures well their contribution to the knowledge stock. Researchers only fail
to internalize the fact that their contribution increases the stock of knowledge
forever. They get rewards from the flow of ideas they produce while society
gets rewards from the stock of ideas.
We capture that with an intertemporal social welfare function given by
SW =
+∞X
t=0
Kt
(1 + φ)t
,
where Kt is the stock of knowledge at t and φ the social discount rate, which
can conveniently be interpreted as an inverse measure of the weight put on
future generations. The evolution of the knowledge stock is then given by, in
regime II,
Kt = Kt−1+µt
Z
ωf(ω)dω+µt−1
Z
ω
ÃZ nt(ω)
n¯
(ω − β(ln z − ln n¯))dz
!
f(ω)dω.
The first integral is the initial value of the fields invented at date t. The
second integral is the contribution of the improvements made during t to the
fields invented at t−1. Note that we integrate the marginal contribution of all
papers ranked between n¯ and nt. This guarantees that researchers internalize
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the congestion externality they exert upon others by moving, through their
contribution, the state of the field down the marginal value curve. In other
words, the intrinsic value of writing a paper in a field with potential ω is
equal to its marginal eﬀect on K, (ω − β(lnnt − ln n¯)).
This equation may be rewritten
Kt = Kt−1 + µtω¯ + µt−1
Z
ω
((ω + β) (nt(ω)− n¯)− βnt (lnnt − ln n¯))f(ω)dω.
(15)
It can easily be shown that, as in the equilibrium, given the fraction of
researchers who work in new fields, it is optimal to allocate the others so as
to equate their intrinsic marginal value across active fields. Otherwise, one
could reallocate the research eﬀort across existing fields to get a higher value
of the last term in (15). Consequently, at each date there exists a critical field
ω∗t such that nt(ω) = n¯ for ω < ω
∗
t and nt(ω) = n¯e
ω−ω∗t
β for ω ≥ ω∗t . In steady
state, ω∗t will be constant through time. Using this property, the evolution
equation for knowledge can be rewritten as
Kt = Kt−1 + µtω¯ + µt−1Γ(ω
∗
t ),
with
Γ(ω∗) = n¯
Z +∞
ω∗
h
(β + ω∗) e
ω−ω∗
β − (β + ω)
i
f(ω)dω.
The social planner’s problem can be rewritten recursively by introducing
the value function
V (µt−1,Kt−1) = max(Kt +
1
1 + φ
V (µt, Kt)).
Maximization takes place with respect to xt, the fraction of research al-
located to new fields. We thus have
µt = γυxt, (16)
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while the resource constraint allows to compute ω∗t as a function of x. Ag-
gregating the number of papers written in existing fields, we get
υ(1− x) = µt−1n¯I∗(ω∗t ). (17)
PROPOSITION 7 — The steady-state, welfare maximizing value of ω∗t is
determined by the following equation:
ω∗ = Ψ(ω∗),
where Ψ(.) is a decreasing function defined by
Ψ(ω∗) = γω¯ +
n¯γ
1 + φ
Z +∞
ω∗
∆(ω − ω∗)f(ω)dω, (18)
and where ∆(.) is a positive, increasing, convex function defined by ∆(x) =
β(ex/β − 1)− x.
PROOF — See Appendix.
The critical level ω∗ is the social opportunity cost of working in an existing
field rather than a new field. Its equivalent in the analysis of the equilibrium is
Vt, which is equal to V¯ , the fixed point of Φ in the equilibrium. Furthermore,
(5) and (6) show that a market economy will allocate employment across
existing fields in exactly the same way as the social optimum if V¯ = ω∗.
Since the resource constraints (16) and (17) are the same in the equilibrium
case and the optimum case, all that is needed to compare the equilibrium
with the optimum is to compare the fixed point of Φ with that of Ψ. If they
coincide, then the equilibrium steady state is identical to the social optimum
steady state. Confronting (7) with (18) we then get that the two fixed points
coincide provided the citation premium is equal to
θ∗ =
n¯β
1 + φ
R +∞
ω∗ ∆(ω − ω∗)f(ω)dωR +∞
ω∗ (ω − ω∗)f(ω)dω
.
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This citation premium goes down with φ, which means that it must be
higher when the social planner cares more about future generations.18 That
is because the social planner puts more weight on subsequent improvements
of a new field, the lower φ. The value of these subsequent improvements—
which raises the value of a new field beyond its contemporaneous eﬀect ω¯—
is internalized by the inventor only through the citation premium. Thus it
must go up when φ goes down.
9 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model of the allocation of eﬀort between
fundamental research, which invents new fields, and applied research, which
improves existing fields. Despite the model’s simplicity, our results are quite
rich.
We were able to characterize the cyclical dynamics of the economy and
derive a necessary and suﬃcient condition for cycles to arise. We have shown
that indeterminacy may also appear, and that the citation premium makes
the equilibrium less cyclical, but at the same time makes indeterminacy more
likely.
We have also established some comparative statics for a steady-state in
regime II, and to compare this steady state to the welfare optimum. We were
able to highlight the role of the option value in determining the optimal and
equilibrium allocation of research between the two activities.
18To see this, simply rewrite (8) as V¯ = Φ(V¯ ; θ), Φ01 < 0, Φ
0
2 > 0, and (18) as ω
∗ =
Ψ(ω∗, φ), Ψ01 < 0,Ψ02 < 0. The welfare maximizing value of θ, θ
∗, is the unique solution to
ω∗ = Φ(ω∗; θ). Hence, ∂θ∗/∂ω∗ > 0. Since ω∗ falls with φ, so does θ∗.
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10 Appendix:
10.1 Proof of proposition 1
λt is the shadow cost of a paper at t. Clearly one must have λt > γω¯, which
is a lower bound for Vt, the value of inventing a new field.
At date t, a field i is exploited if and only if
ω(i)− β(lnnt−1(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt−1(i)) < λt,
in which case nt is determined by
ω(i)− β(lnnt(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i)) = λt.
A. One cannot forever remain in regime I
As if the θ = 0 case, we first prove that one cannot stay forever in regime
I. We do so by contradiction.
Assume the economy is always in regime I from t on. Call µ the total
mass of existing fields, indexed by i, and dF (i) their density. Assume a field
is exploited at t. Then
ω(i)− β(lnnt(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i)) = λt > γω¯; therefore,
lnnt+1(i) ≥
β + θ
θ
lnnt(i) +
γω¯
θ
− ω(i)
θ
− β ln n¯
θ
.
A suﬃcient condition for nt+1(i) > nt(i) is therefore
nt(i) > n¯e
ω(i)−γω¯
β = k(i) (19)
. Hence, if a field is exploited at t and satisfies (19), then it will be exploited
at t + 1. Since nt+1(i) in turn also satisfies (19), one has nt+2(i) > nt+1(i),
and so on. Therefore:
If a field satisfies (19) and is exploited at t, i.e. nt(i) > nt−1(i), then it is
exploited forever.
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Assume that at date t there is a set Λ with strictly positive measure of
active fields such that (19) holds. Then, for each of these fields, nt+s+1(i) =
nt+s(i)
³
nt+s(i)
k(i)
´β
θ
.The quantity nt+s+1(i)−nt+s(i) is growing without bounds,
which contradicts the requirement that µ
R
Λ(nt+s+1(i) − nt+s(i))dF (i) ≤ ν.
Consequently, such a set cannot exist. Let then Λt be the set of all active
fields at t. It must be that (19) is violated almost everywhere over Λt. Let
κt(i) = max(k(i)− nt(i), 0) ≥ 0. We have thatZ
Λt
nt(i)dF (i) =
Z
Λt
nt−1(i)dF (i) +
ν
µ
Furthermore, as nt−1(i) < nt(i) < k(i) almost everywhere:
Z
Λt
κt(i)dF (i) =
Z
Λt
(k(i)− nt(i))dF (i)
=
Z
Λt
(k(i)− nt−1(i))dF (i)−
ν
µ
=
Z
Λt
κt−1(i)dF (i)−
ν
µ
.
On the other hand, nt(i) = nt−1(i) for i /∈ Λt, implying κt(i) = κt−1(i).
Therefore: Z
Ω
κt(i)dF (i) =
Z
Ω
κt−1(i)dF (i)−
ν
µ
.
We have constructed a sequence of positive functions whose integral even-
tually becomes negative, which is a contradiction.
B. Characterizing dynamics in regime I
Let then T be the date when regime I ends: at date T one is in regime II.
Let VT be the value of working in a new field at T. By assumption, all fields
invented prior to T are obsolete after T +1. Hence T must be the last period
when fields active during the regime I phase are exploited. An existing field
is active at T iﬀ
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ω(i)− β(lnnT−1 − ln n¯) > VT ,
in which case nT is determined by
ω(i)− β(lnnT − ln n¯) = VT .
Consider now a date t < T in the regime I phase. Denoting by λt the
shadow cost of a paper, a field is active iﬀ
ω(i)− β(lnnt−1(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt−1) > λt
In which case
ω(i)− β(lnnt(i)− ln n¯) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i)) = λt.
We now construct a sequence λˆt such that the following property holds:
PROPERTY P1 — A field is active iﬀ ω(i) − β(lnnt−1 − ln n¯) > λˆt, in
which case ω(i)− β(lnnt − ln n¯)) = λˆt.
The sequence is constructed by backward induction, starting from t = T.
We clearly can pick λˆT = VT . Now, assume P1 holds for t0 > t.
Assume λt > λˆt+1. Then all active fields at t must also be active at t+1.
To prove so, suppose there is a field i active at t and inactive at t+ 1. Then
it must be that nt+1(i) = nt(i). So that ω(i) − β(lnnt − ln n¯)) ≤ λˆt+1 and
ω(i)− β(lnnt− ln n¯)) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i)) = λt = ω(i)− β(lnnt− ln n¯)),
which violates the assumption that λt > λˆt+1.
Then, a field is active at t if and only if
ω(i)− β(lnnt−1 − ln n¯) + θ(ln n¯+
ω(i)− λˆt+1
β
− lnnt−1) > λt
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If we define λˆt =
θλˆt+1+βλt
θ+λ , we get that this equation is equivalent to
ω(i) − β(lnnt−1 − ln n¯) > λˆt, and we can check that we then have ω(i) −
β(lnnt − ln n¯)) = λˆt.
Assume λt ≤ λˆt+1.Consider a field active at both t and t+1. Then wemust
have ω(i)−β(lnnt(i)− ln n¯)) < ω(i)−β(lnnt− ln n¯))+θ(lnnt+1(i)− lnnt(i))
= λt ≤ λˆt+1 = ω(i)− β(lnnt+1(i)− ln n¯)), implying that nt+1(i) < nt(i),
which cannot be. Therefore, all fields active at t must be inactive at t + 1,
in which case we just pick up λˆt = λt.
To summarize, the λˆt sequence can be constructed as
λˆT = VT ;
λˆt = min(
θλˆt+1 + βλt
θ + β
, λt). (20)
Let T0 be the initial period of that phase in regime I. Denoting by µT0−1
the measure of exploitable fields, we can now get the evolution of the λˆts.
We have that
µT0−1
Z
ω(i)>λˆT0
(n¯e
ω(i)−λˆT0
β − n¯) = ν,
or equivalently
µT0−1n¯I
∗(λˆT0) = ν. (21)
This equation allows to compute λˆT0 as a function of µT0−1. At date T0+1,
there are two kinds of fields: those which were exploited at T0, whose value
of nT0(i) satisfies (P1), and those which were not, such that nT0(i) = n¯. If
λˆT0+1 ≥ λˆT0 , no field can be exploited at t+1, which is not possible. Therefore
it must be that λˆT0+1 < λˆT0 . One can then compute λˆT0+1 as
µT0−1
Z
ω(i)>λˆT0
(n¯e
ω(i)−λˆT0+1
β −n¯e
ω(i)−λˆT0
β )dF (i)+µT0−1
Z
λˆT0>ω(i)>λˆT0+1
(n¯e
ω(i)−λˆT0+1
β −n¯)dF (i) = ν,
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or equivalently
µT0−1n¯(I
∗(λˆT0+1)− I∗(λˆT0)) = ν. (22)
Similarly, assuming λˆ is falling between T0 and t, at the beginning of
t + 1, fields can be split between those which were never exploited, so that
nt(i) = n¯ and those which were exploited at t, such that nt(i) = n¯e
ω(i)−λˆt
β .
Again, it must be that λˆt+1 < λˆt, so that the λˆs must fall by induction. And
they must again satisfy
µT0−1n¯(I
∗(λˆt+1)− I∗(λˆt)) = ν. (23)
Given that λˆt+1 < λˆt, it must be that λt > λˆt+1, so that active fields at t
remain so until the end of regime I.
In regime I, the value of working on a new field must not exceed the value
of working in existing fields. Consider a field invented at t. As this field would
be infinitesimal, it would not make other fields obsolete at t+1. Its value at
t is
W (i) = ω(i) + θ(lnnt+1(i)− ln n¯)
= ω(i) +
θ
β
(ω(i)− λˆt+1), if ω(i) > λˆt+1,
and
W (i) = ω(i)
if not. Therefore, the value of working on a new field at t is equal to
VNt = γ
∙
ω¯ +
θ
β
Z
ω(i)>λˆt+1
(ω(i)− λˆt+1)
¸
= Φ(λˆt+1).
Hence for the economy to be in regime I, the following must hold:
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Φ(λˆt+1) < λt. (24)
C. Characterizing dynamics in regime II.
We now characterize the dynamics in regime II. Because a positive mea-
sure of new fields is invented at every period, fields invented at t are at most
only exploited at t+ 1. Such a field i will be exploited at t+ 1 if and only if
ω(i) > Vt+1,
in which case
lnnt+1 = ln n¯+
ω(i)− Vt+1
β
.
Consequently, the value of a new field at t is
W (i) = ω(i) +
θ
β
(ω(i)− Vt+1), if ω(i) > Vt+1,
and
W (i) = ω(i)
if not. Integrating, we get that
VNt = γ
"
ω¯ +
θ
β
Z
ω(i)>VNt+1
(ω(i)− Vt+1)
#
(25)
= Φ(Vt+1).
This defines the dynamics of VNt in regime II. Denoting now by µt the
measure of fields invented at t, the input into working in existing fields at
t+ 1 is
νAt+1 = µt
Z
ω(i)>VNt+1
(n¯e
ω(i)−Vt+1
β − n¯)
= n¯I∗(Vt+1)µt.
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Therefore the dynamics of µ are given by
µt+1 = γ(ν − n¯I∗(Vt+1)µt). (26)
To remain in regime II this formula must yield a positive value of µt+1
throughout.
D. The transition from regime I to regime II
Consider now the first period in regime II, T. We focus on the case
where VT < λˆT−1. The other possibility will be ruled out further below.
That inequality is equivalent to
I∗(λˆT−1) < I
∗(VT ) (27)
Then, fields active during regime I are still exploited at T. The total input
into active fields at T is given by
µT0−1n¯(I
∗(VT )− I∗(λˆT−1)) = νAT .
For this to be consistent with equilibrium, we need that νAt < ν, that is:
I∗(λˆT−1) > I∗(VT )−
ν
µT0−1n¯
. (28)
Because of (22), for a given VT and a given µT0−1, there exists at most a
unique value of T such that (28) and (27) simultaneously hold. Therefore,
the duration (and characteristics) of the regime I phase are entirely pinned
down by the initial measure of exploitable fields µT0−1 and the terminal value
VT . The phase lasts at least one period if and only if I∗(λˆT0) < I
∗(VT ), or
equivalently
I∗(VT ) >
ν
µT0−1n¯
. (29)
Otherwise, there cannot be a phase in regime I (we are in the special case
where T = T0.)
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If (29) holds, then the initial measure of invented fields at the beginning
of regime II is
µT = γ(ν − µT0−1n¯(I
∗(VT )− I∗(λˆT−1))). (30)
The economy then evolves as described above.
E. The transition from regime II to regime I
Next, consider the value of inventing a new field at date T0−1. It is given
by
VT0−1 = Φ(λˆT0) (31)
This defines a negative relationship between λˆT0 and VT0−1. At the same
time, (21) defines λˆT0 uniquely as an increasing function of µT0−1. Thus, there
must be a one-to-one, decreasing relationship between µT0−1 and VT0−1 :
VT0−1 = Φ(I
∗−1
µ
ν
µT0−1n¯
¶
). (32)
F. Ruling out the case VT > λˆT−1.
The above argument about the decreasing sequence λˆt does not apply
to its terminal value VT , since it rests on the argument that all labor goes
into existing fields. Let us now examine the case VT > λˆT−1. If this holds,
no existing field is exploited at T. Thus, it must be that µT = γν. Because
of (20), it must also be that λT−1 = λˆT−1 > VT−1 = Φ(VT ). Therefore,
VT > Φ(VT ), implying that VT > V¯ , where V¯ is the steady state value V in
regime II; V¯ = Φ(V¯ ).
Assume the economy is still in regime II at T +1. Then, (26) implies that
µT+1 = γ(ν − n¯I∗(VT+1)γν).
Since VT+1 = Φ−1(VT ) < V¯ , I∗(VT+1) > I∗(V¯ ). A suﬃcient condition for
the RHS of this equation to be negative is thus
n¯I∗(V¯ )γ > 1 (33)
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When constructing a cyclical equilibrium, we will assume that (33) holds.
In this case, the economy cannot be be in regime II at T + 1.
Assume the economy is in regime I at T + 1, and that (33). Then T is
the last period in regime II before regime I. VT must therefore satisfy (32)
for µT = γν
VT = Φ(I∗−1
µ
1
γn¯
¶
).
Using (33) again, we see that V¯ < I∗−1( 1γn¯), implying V¯ = Φ(V¯ ) >
Φ(I∗−1( 1γn¯)) = VT , which contradicts the observation that VT > V¯ . Under
assumption (33), it can therefore never be that VT > λˆT−1.
G. Constructing an equilibrium
Let t be a period in regime II and s the last period in regime II before t.
Given Vt and the number of fields invented in the previous regime II episode,
µs, we can compute exactly whether or not there will be a period in regime
I between s and t.
We know that if (29) holds, i.e. if Vt < I∗−1( νn¯µs ), there is a regime-I
episode. Its duration must satisfy (28) and (27), and the new mass of fields
invented is given by (30). Finally, the λˆ sequence must satisfy (23). Putting
these things together, we see that the duration of the cycle must be equal to
INT (µsn¯ν I
∗(Vt)) and that the new value of µt must be equal to
µt = γν(1−DEC
³µsn¯
ν
I∗(Vt)
´
) = m(µs, Vt). (34)
If (29) is violated, i.e. if Vt > I∗−1( νn¯µs ), there is no regime I period
between s and t. One must then have t = s+1. µt is computed using regime
II dynamics, i.e. (26), which, given that µsn¯ν I
∗(Vt) < 1, is equivalent to (34).
Therefore, it must be that
µt = m(µs, Vt).
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The discontinuity points of m(µs, .) are given by I
∗(V ) = kυµsn¯ , i.e. they
are precisely equal to the successive values of λˆt during the regime I phase.
The value of k corresponding to the discontinuity point immediately above
Vt must be equal to the duration of the regime I phase. As Vt ≥ γω¯, this
duration cannot exceed µsn¯I
∗(γω¯)/υ ≤ γn¯I∗(γω¯).
To continue the construction of the equilibrium, we must pick the value
of Vt such that in the last period in regime II, the equilibrium condition for
the transition from regime II to regime I, (32), holds. We prove that such a
Vt exists as follows.
For u = t, ..., T, an admissible sequence of pairs {(xu, yu), u = t, ..., T} is
a sequence of real numbers such that
xu = γ(ν − n¯xu−1I∗(yu)), u > t (35)
yu = Φ(yu+1), t ≤ u < T ;
yT ∈ (γω¯, (γ +
θ
β
)ω¯)
Note that, a priori, we do not rule out negative values for xu.
An admissible sequence is feasible iﬀ
xu ≥ 0, ∀u; (36)
xt = m(µs, yt). (37)
If we find a feasible sequence such that
yT = Φ(I∗−1
µ
ν
xT n¯
¶
), (38)
then we can construct a phase in regime II during T −t periods starting from
T, such that the transitional condition (32) holds, by choosing µt = xt and
Vt = yt.
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A feasible sequence is maximal iﬀ
n¯xT I
∗(Φ−1(yT )) > ν. (39)
That condition implies that there cannot be another feasible sequence
{(x0u, y0u), u = t, ..., T 0} such that T 0 > T and (x0u, y0u) = (xu, yu) for all u ≤ T,
because the implied value of xT+1 would be negative.
PROPERTY P2 — Any feasible sequence is such that
n¯xuI∗(Φ−1(yu)) ≤ ν, for all u < T.
PROOF — For u < T one must have 0 ≤ xu+1 = γ(ν − n¯xuI∗(yu+1)) =
γ(ν − n¯xuI∗(Φ−1(yu))). QED.
Let us now denote by K = {I∗−1( kυµsn¯), k = 1, ...} the set of discontinuity
points of m(). Then for any admissible sequence such that yt /∈ K, xu and
yu are locally C1 functions of yt. Furthermore, as yt varies, the following
properties hold:
PROPERTY P3 — Assume yt /∈ K. Then:
(i) dyudyt > 0 if u− t is even, < 0 if u− t is odd.
(ii) dyudyt
dxu
dyt
> 0.
PROOF — Property (i) derives trivially from the fact that yu = Φ(yu+1).
Property (ii) can be proved by induction. It is clearly true for u = t, as
∂m/∂VN > 0. Assume it holds for u− 1. Diﬀerentiating (35), we get
dxu = −dxu−1
n¯γ
ν
I∗(yu)−
n¯γ
ν
xu−1I∗
0
(yu)dyu.
By assumption, sign(dxu−1) = sign(dyu−1) = −sign(dyu). Consequently,
the first term has the same sign as dyu, and so does the second, as I∗
0
() < 0.
QED.
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Thus, as the initial value yt varies, subsequent contemporaneous values
of x and y move in the same direction.
PROPERTYP4 — Assume that there exist two feasible sequences {(x0u, y0u), u =
t, ..., T}, and {(x1u, y1u), u = t, ..., T} such that for some integer k :
I∗−1(
kυ
µsn¯
) < y0t < y1t < I∗−1(
(k − 1)υ
µsn¯
).
Then there exists a family of mappings Xu(y) (resp. Yu(y)) from [y0t, y1t]
to [x0u, x1u] (resp. [y0u, y1u]) such that
(i) Xu(y) and Yu(y) are continuously diﬀerentiable in y
(ii) {(Xu(y),Yu(y),u = t, ..., T} is feasible;
(iii) Xt(y) = m(µs−1, y);Yt(y) = y
(iv) Xu(y0t) = x0u; Yu(y0t) = y0u;Xu(y1t) = x1u; Yu(y1t) = y1u
(v) X 0u > 0, Y
0
u > 0 for u− t even, and X 0u < 0, Y 0u < 0 for u− t odd.
PROOF — The condition implies that y0t and y1t are between two con-
secutive discontinuity points. m(µs, .) is therefore C
1 over [y0t, y1t]. We can
then construct Yu() recursively as Yt(y) = y and Yu(y) = Φ−1(Yu−1(y)); sim-
ilarly, Xu() is constructed recursively as Xt(y) = m(µs−1, y), Xu(y) = γ(ν −
n¯Xu−1(y)I∗(Yu(y))). Thus, (i),(iii) and (iv) trivially hold. The monotonicity
properties (v) in turn are a consequence of property P3. Finally, the fea-
sibility property (ii) is a consequence of monotonicity: while (37) holds by
construction, (36) derives from the fact that Xu(y) is between x0u and x1u,
which are both nonnegative. QED.
With these properties in hand, we are now able to construct a feasible
sequence such that (38) holds. Denoting again by V¯ the fixed point of Φ(),
and assuming (33) holds, there necessarily exists a maximal sequence such
that yu = V¯ , for all u. Again, that is because the dynamics of x are then
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unstable if (33) holds. Call x˜u the values of xu in that sequence. Because of
(39), we must have
V¯ > Φ(I∗−1(
ν
n¯x˜T
))
Consider now the admissible sequence of equal length T, {(xˆu, yˆu), u =
t, ..., T}, such that yˆT = Φ(I∗−1( νn¯x˜T )). It can be easily constructed by iter-
ating Φ() backwards on yˆT , yielding some yˆt, and then computing the corre-
sponding values of xu by applying (35). Three possibilities arise:
G1. The admissible sequence is feasible and yˆt is such that I∗−1( kυµsn¯) <
yˆt < V¯ < I∗−1(
(k−1)υ
µsn¯
) (for T − t even), or I∗−1( kυµsn¯) < V¯ < yˆt < I
∗−1( (k−1)υµsn¯
)
(for T − t odd).
In this case, we note that property P4 can be applied, using the feasi-
ble sequences {(x˜u, V¯ )} and {(xˆu, yˆu)} as our boundaries. Because of the
monotonicity property (v), it must be that xˆT < x˜T , since yˆT < V¯ . Therefore
yˆT = Φ(I∗−1( νn¯x˜T )) < Φ(I
∗−1( νn¯xˆT )). Hence:
yˆT < Φ(I∗−1(
ν
n¯x˜T
)).
Therefore, the function YT (y)−Φ(I∗−1( νn¯XT (y))), which is continuous, be-
comes positive and negative as y varies between yˆt and V¯ . There exists y∗ ∈
[yˆt, V¯ ], such that it is equal to zero. The sequence {(Xu(y∗),Yu(y∗),u =
t, ..., T} is feasible because of property (ii), and satisfies (38).
G2. The admissible sequence is not feasible, but yˆt satisfies I∗−1( kυµsn¯) <
yˆt < V¯ < I∗−1(
(k−1)υ
µsn¯
) (for T − t even), or I∗−1( kυµsn¯) < V¯ < yˆt < I
∗−1( (k−1)υµsn¯
)
(for T − t odd).
In this case, lack of feasibility must be due to the fact that (36) is violated.
We can then construct a maximal sequence {(xˆu, yˆu), u = t, ..., T2} for some
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T2 < T.19
Because of Property (P2), we have that
V¯ ≤ Φ(I∗−1( υ
x˜T2n¯
)).
Because of the maximality condition (39), we have that
yˆT2 > Φ(I
∗−1(
υ
xˆT2n¯
)).
As {(xˆu, yˆu), u = t, ..., T2} is now feasible, we can apply the same reasoning
as in case G1, but between t and T2 instead of t and T.
G3. The admissible sequence does not satisfy I∗−1( kυµsn¯) < yˆt < V¯ <
I∗−1( (k−1)υµsn¯ ) (for T − t even), or I
∗−1( kυµsn¯
) < V¯ < yˆt < I∗−1(
(k−1)υ
µsn¯
) (for T − t
odd).
Assume T −t is even. Then it must be that yˆt < I∗−1( kυµsn¯) < V¯ . Consider
now ym = I∗−1( kυµsn¯)+η, for η > 0 arbitrarily small. Note that Φ
−1(ym) exists,
as ym ∈ [yˆt, V¯ ]. The two-period sequence {(xmt, ymt), (xmt+1, ymt+1)} defined
by xmt = (m(µs, ym), ymt = ym, xmt+1 = (γ(ν − n¯m(µs, ym)I∗(Φ−1(ym)),
ymt+1 = Φ−1(ym)), is clearly feasible, since ymt+1 ∈ [V¯ , yˆt+1], m(µs, ym) is
positive and arbitrarily close to zero, and xmt+1 is thus arbitrarily close to
γν.
Next, note that the maximality condition holds for t+ 1, since
n¯(γν)I∗(Φ−1(ymt+1)) > n¯(γν)I∗(Φ−1(V¯ )) > ν,
because of (33).
Thus, this 2 period sequence is maximal, and satisfies
19Furthermore T − T2 has to be odd. That is because, by construction, xˆu < x˜u
and ωˆt < V¯ if T − T2 is even (due to Property P3), implying that n¯xˆT2I∗(Φ−1(ωˆu)) ≤
n¯x˜T2I
∗(Φ−1(V¯ )) ≤ ν, where the last inequality is due to (P2). That violates the maxi-
mality condition (39).
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ymt+1 > Φ(I∗−1(
υ
xmt+1n¯
)),
while, again because of (P2):
V¯ < Φ(I∗−1(
υ
x˜t+1n¯
)).
We are again in a position to apply the same continuity argument as in
cases G1 and G2.
Assume T − t is odd. Then it must be that V¯ < I∗−1( (k−1)υµsn¯ ) < yˆt.
Consider now ym = I∗−1(
(k−1)υ
µsn¯
) − η, for η > 0 arbitrarily small. The one-
period sequence {(xmt, ymt)} defined by xmt = m(µs, ym), ymt = ym, is clearly
feasible. Again, note that because of (33), the maximality condition holds
for t, since
n¯(γν)I∗(Φ−1(ymt)) > n¯(γν)I∗(Φ−1(V¯ )) > ν.
We have constructed a maximal sequence which satisfies ymt > Φ(I∗−1( υxmtn¯)).
Property (P2) again implies that V¯ < Φ(I∗−1( υx˜tn¯)). Since I
∗−1( kυµsn¯
) < V¯ <
ymt < I∗−1(
(k−1)υ
µsn¯
), we can again apply the continuity argument as in G1 to
construct a one-period sequence matching the equilibrium condition (38).
Thus we are always able to construct a feasible sequence such that the
equilibrium condition (38) holds.
The only equilibrium condition that remains to be checked is condition
(24) in the regime I phase. Noting that, during that phase, λu = λˆu+ θβ (λˆu−
λˆu+1), that condition is equivalent to
Φ(λˆu+1) < λˆu +
θ
β
(λˆu − λˆu+1). (40)
Observe now that we have constructed the value of Vt at the end of phase
I in such a way that Vt falls in the same [I∗−1( kυµsn¯), I
∗−1( (k−1)υµsn¯
)] as V¯ . Since
I∗−1( (k−1)υµsn¯ ) = λˆt−1, it follows that λˆt−1 > V¯ > Φ(λˆt−1); since the λˆ are a
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decreasing sequence, we also have that λˆu > V¯ > Φ(λˆu) for all u. Consider
now the function defined by Λ(λ, y) = λ+βλ(λ−y)−Φ(y). Clearly, Λ(λˆu, λˆu) =
λˆu−Φ(λˆu) > 0. Furthermore, as γ < 1, ∂Λ∂y = −
θ
β + γ
θ
β (1−F (y)) < 0. Thus,
Λ(λˆu, y) > 0 for all y < λˆu. In particular, Λ(λˆu, λˆu+1) > 0, which is equivalent
to (A22).
That concludes the proof that a cyclical equilibrium exists.
H. Constructing an equilibrium when (33) does not hold.
We have constructed a cyclical equilibrium when (33) holds. If it does
not, we can easily construct an equilibrium in regime II which converges to
the steady state. To do so, start from an inherited mass of invented fields
µs at the beginning of the (potentially empty) phase in regime I, and choose
Vt = V¯ , µt = m(µs, V¯ ). This defines an initial phase in regime I whose length
equals the number of discontinuity points of m(µs, .) above V¯ . Thereafter,
the measure of new fields evolves according to
µu+1 = γ(ν − n¯I∗(V¯ )µu),
and, given that (33) is violated and that m(µs, V¯ ) ∈ [0, γυ], it is straightfor-
ward to check that µu will converge to its steady-state value by damped os-
cillations, remaining in the feasible [0, γυ] interval. Furthermore, the largest
discontinuity point ofm() is at I∗−1( υµsn¯) < I
∗−1( 1γn¯) < V¯ . Thus the economy
in fact does not spend any time in regime I.
I. Proof of uniqueness when θ = 0.
If the feasible sequence constructed in G. is unique, then the equilibrium is
unique. That is easy to prove in the θ = 0 case. The initial value of Vt, at the
beginning of regime II, must be equal to γω¯. Furthermore, the date at which
the economy leaves regime II to revert to regime I is uniquely determined: If
it were such that n¯xuI∗(γω¯) ≤ υ, then (29) would be violated for the next
regime I phase, since one must have V = γω¯ at the end of that regime.
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Therefore, it must be equal to the first date such that n¯xuI∗(γω¯) > υ, since
the economy cannot feasibly remain in regime II after that date.
10.2 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Recall, V¯ is increasing in θ and I∗ is decreasing. Thus, if the condition
I∗(V¯ ) < 1γn¯ is satisfied for θ, it is also satisfied for θ
0 > θ.
(ii) The duration of the first regime I phase is INT (I∗(γω¯) n¯µ−1ν ) when
θ = 0 and INT (I∗(VT )
n¯µ−1
ν ) when θ > 0. Since VT ≥ γω¯, the first regime I
phase is necessarily longer when θ > 0. Examining the equation for µ gives
the second result.
10.3 Proof of Proposition 6
To prove Proposition 6, just diﬀerentiate the dynamics of Vt in regime II,
Vt = Φ(Vt+1), around the fixed point V¯ . Denoting by vt = Vt − V¯ , we get
vt =
γθ
β
(1− F (V¯ ))vt+1.
If γθβ (1−F (V¯ )) > 1, then we can construct an equilibrium for any initial
value of vt. QED.
10.4 Proof of Proposition 7
The first order condition for maximization of the value function with respect
to x is
0 =
µ
ω¯
∂µt
∂x
+ µt−1Γ
0(ω∗)
∂ω∗
∂x
¶µ
1 +
1
1 + φ
∂V (µt, Kt)
∂K
¶
+
1
1 + φ
∂µt
∂x
∂V (µt, Kt)
∂µt
. (41)
The resource constraints allow us to compute the following derivatives:
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• ∂µt∂x = γυ
• ∂ω∗∂x = − υI∗0(ω∗)µt−1n¯
∂ω∗
∂µt−1
= − I∗(ω∗)I∗0(ω∗)µt−1 .
Diﬀerentiating the value function while ignoring the changes in x because
of the envelope theorem allows to compute the following:
• ∂V∂K = 1+φφ .
• ∂V (µt−1,Kt−1)∂µt−1 =
³
Γ(ω∗) + µt−1Γ
0(ω∗) ∂ω
∗
∂µt−1
´
1+φ
φ .
Substituting these formulas into (41) while making use of the steady state
assumption, we get
0 =
µ
ω¯γυ − Γ0(ω∗) υ
I∗0(ω∗)n¯
¶
+
1
1 + φ
γυ
µ
Γ(ω∗)− Γ0(ω∗) I
∗(ω∗)
I∗0(ω∗)
¶
. (42)
To get to (18), compute the derivatives of Γ and I∗ :
• Γ0(ω∗) = −n¯ω∗β
R +∞
ω∗ e
ω−ω∗
β f(ω)dω;
• I∗0(ω∗) = − 1β
R +∞
ω∗ e
ω−ω∗
β f(ω)dω.
Replace all the terms in Γ0(ω∗)/I∗0(ω∗) in (42) by n¯ω∗, and replace the
term in Γ(ω∗) by the following expression (it can be checked that it is indeed
equal to Γ(ω∗)):
(β + ω∗)n¯I∗(ω∗)− n¯
Z +∞
ω∗
(ω − ω∗) f(ω)dω.
These operations yield equation (18). QED
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Figure 2 – Equilibrium determination in regime I
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Fig 6: mass of new fields per cycle
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Fig. 7 cycle length and mass of new fields
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Fig. 8 time spent in regime II
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Fig. 9: Average production of new fields in regime II per cycle
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Fig. 10: Time in regime II and average innovation
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Fig. 11: cycle duration in reg. I, beta = 0.2
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Fig. 12, time spent in regime II per cycle, beta = 0.2
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